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NON-BINDING PROMISES AS CONSIDERATION
In thousands of cases it has been dogmatically stated that both
parties to a contract must be bound or neither is bound. So convincing
was this dictum that it has been a painfully slow process to re-introduce
to the legal profession the unilateral contract-the only kind of contract
that our ancestors knew a few centuries ago. It is still generally be-
lieved, even by those who well understand the unilateral contract, that
the dictum is quiie correct with respect to bilateral contracts; and the
suggestion of Professor Oliphant that this may never be so came as a
surprise. Everyone had known, indeed, that the dictum did not fully
apply to contracts between an infant and an adult, contracts within the
Statute of Frauds signed by one party only, and contracts induced by the
fraud of one party; but it was loosely supposed that these cases could
be harmonized with the dictum by use of the magic words "voidable"
and "unenforceable." Both parties were "bound"; but one had the power
of avoidance of the whole, upon the exercise of which neither was
bound. It can easily be shown that this analysis is unsound in very
many cases;' and we must admit that the dictum is subject to many
clear exceptions. Have the exceptions, in this case as in sa many others,
come to occupy the whole field?
-The present writer is not yet ready to abandon the dictum alto-
gether; but he is thoroughly convinced that its correctness as a rule
of law cannot be established by any mere deductive process based upon
some more ancient and general rule of law. It can be established only
by a collection of decisions in point; or, if we are willing to trust them,
by a collection of the dicta of judges and legal writers. No attempt
will be made here to present the collected decisions or dicta.2 The prob-
lem will merely be discussed briefly from the writer's personal point of
view.
In neither of the two great systems of law with which we are fa-
miliar are all informal promises enforceable. Courts and lawyers,
1 In the case of a wholly executory bilateral contract whereby an infant
promises to render service and the adult promises payment after full perform-
ance, it is no breach of legal duty for the infant to fail to perform. Even in
the absence of any disaffirmance, a complaint alleging all the facts would be
demurrable. The same is true of a wholly executory bilateral contract induced
by the fraud of one of the parties. In an action for breach the defendant call
successfully plead the plaintiff's fraud, without showing any notice or other act
of disaffirmance or recission by himself. The existing facts created no duty in
him. Roberts v. James (1912) 83 N. J. L. 492. Yet in such cases, the defendant
could have enforced the contract against the plaintiff.
'Professor Oliphant cites numerous legal writers in Mutuality of Obligation
in Bilateral Contracts (1925) 25 Columbia Law Rev. 705.
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therefore, must search for the test or tests by which the enforceable
can be distinguished from the unenforceable. In the civil law one of
these tests parades under the pseudonym of "causa"; in the common
law under that of "consideration." All too readily do we suppose that
"the law" on these and other subjects is certain and knowable. All too
blithely do we assume that there is only one "correct" definition of
terms and one rule of legal sufficiency by which decisions can be tested.
In fact the "causa" that in the long history of the civil law made prom-
ises binding is an indeterminate and variable quantity.3 The same is
equally true of "consideration." Anglo-American law did not start
with a definition or a rule of legal sufficiency. Instead, we have several
centuries full of decisions in specific cases, furnishing at every stage
in their progress a new inductive basis for definition and stated rule,
an ever changing basis on which all alike are free to build, yesterday,
now, and forever. Some rules are more persistent than others. It
may be that one such rule is that a promise is not a sufficient considera-
tion for a return promise if it can be affirmatively shown that it is not
binding on the one who made it.
Let us consider the so-called "illusory promise."'4 Suppose that S
guarantees P's note in return for C's written promise to forbear from
suing P as long as C wishes so to forbear. C's promise is said to be
"illusory," and it is said that S's guaranty is not binding for lack of a
sufficient consideration. In what does the "illusion" consist; and why is
the consideration not "sufficient" (one that along with other facts will
be operative to create a legal duty in S) ?
If S asked C for that written form of expression he got exactly
what he asked for.5 If S had asked for a different form of expression,
he would not have received what he asked for. The case would then be
determined by the rules of mutual assent and of mistake, not by the
definition of a "sufficient" consideration.
3 Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts (1919) 28
Yale Law Journ. 621.
' See my discussion in The Effect of Options on Consideration (1925) 34
Yale Law Journ. 571, 573 et seq.
Professors Williston and Oliphant (1925) 25 Columbia Law Rev. 719, 860
both say that the contractor requests in return "not simply an expression" but an
"assurance in fact." What is an "assurance in fact" other than an expression
that expresses something? Surely it is not meant to abandon the objective test
of contract and make it depend upon the subjective state of mind of either the
promisor or the promisee. When a contractor requests a certain "expression,"
he does not request a word with the tongue obviously in the cheek; in such case
he does not get the requested expression. But when two parties sign a written
document with numerous terms in specific language, each gets exactly the ex-
pression and the "assurance" that he requests, despite the fact that there may be
contained only an illusory semblance of a promise by the other party. When
he requests this particular written "assurance" he is not asking for a state of
mind; he cannot escape contractual duty on the ground that the words mean
less than he supposed.
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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Even if S got exactly what he asked for and was under no mistake
or illusion as to what he got, still the promise of C has been described
as "illusory." The reason for this is that by the ordinary concept of
"promise" the "illusory promise" is not a promise at all. The funda-
mental element of promise seems to be an expression of intention by
the promisor that his future conduct shall be in accordance with his
present expression, irrespective of what his will may be when the time
for performance arrives." This element is wholly lacking if the expres-
sion is like that of C above where he said that he would forbear as long
as he wished so to do. The clear meaning of this expression is that C's
future conduct is to be in accordance with his own future will, just as
it would have been had he said nothing at all. In the absence of mistake
as to what was said by C there is nothing illusory about this. An
"illusory promise" is merely a group of words that lack the principal
definitional element of a promise.
It may be that many of the cases holding a seemingly bilateral
agreement invalid when one of the expressions is not in fact a promise
can be explained on the ground of mistake or lack of mutual assent-
the "illusory promise" made was not the promise that was asked for.7
In some of them the decision is expressly based upon the doctrine of
consideration.8 It is to be observed that in such cases the court is deal-
ing with a unilateral, not a bilateral contract. There is only one promise
made; and strictly the case is not within our 'present subject. But such
agreements are usually spoken of as bilateral; and the reasons why the
"illusory promise" is not a sufficient consideration are probably identical
with those given for holding that a real promise is not sufficient if it
can be shown to be not binding.
Professors Williston and Oliphant (1925) 25 Columbia Law Rev. 719, 860
a volition to set some objective limits to one's freedom of action."
'In Great Northern R. R. v. Withain (1873) L. R. 9 C. P. 16, the defendant
offered to supply all goods that the Railroad might order of him. The Railroad
replied promising to buy all that it might so order. This reply contains an "il-
lusory promise"; but it was not responsive to the offer. The true response was an
order for goods, with its implied promise to pay a specific sum; when such a
response came there was an acceptance making a good bilateral contract.
Chicago & G. E. R. R. v. Dane (1870) 43 N. Y. 240 was decided rather on the
ground' of lack of proper acceptance than for lack of sufficient consideration.
In Hopkins v. Racine Iron Co. (1909) 137 Wis. 583, 119 N. W. 301. the defend-
ant promised to furnish castings as ordered. Both parties seem to have thought
that this promise was a contract; but the plaintiff made not even an "illusory
promise" in return. Prior to acceptance by ordering some castings the defend-
ant promised to furnish castings as ordered. Both parties seem to have thought
Sheffeld (1895) 144 N. Y. 392, 39 N. E. 330. Probably most of the cases saying
that both parties must be bound are cases where one party gave nothing whatever,
not even an "illusory promise".
' Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory (1921) 231 N. Y.
459, 132 N. E. 148. The court interpreted the buyer's written words as being a
promise to buy such glue as it might thereafter order of the defendant. The
words were "contract for your requirements of glue for the year 1916," the
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Why does not the community regard the "illusory" or the non-
binding promise as a good reason for using compulsion against the,
other party? Is it because "in the eye of the law" it has no "value"?
It is doubtful whether the idea of "value" in an economic sense
played any large conscious part in the development of the doctrine of
consideration. The courts have uniformly refused to go into the
question of relative values, except to establish fraud or the absence of
a bargain in fact.9 "Value" is determined by the existence of a market;
and a bargain in fact proves that one market exists. The value depends
upon the appetite of him who buys. The law of consideration is not
made to assist the poor buyer in his struggle for life. To some slight
degree, however, the validity of a bargain- may be determined by ex-
trinsic markets. Possibly a consideration is not sufficient unless there
are such extrinsic markets to give it some value. The markets for "illu-
sory" and non-binding promises are no doubt few and weak. Yet it
seems never to have been stated that a consideration is insufficient in
case no market other than the present buyer can be shown to exist.
Professor Williston agrees that there are considerations having
economic value that are nevertheless not legally sufficient to make a
return promise binding.'0 Further, he does not assert that considera-
tions having no economic value are never sufficient. Value in the eco-
nomic or factual sense not being the test, he falls back upon "legal
value," or *"value in a technical sense," or "value in the eye of the
law.""" How are we to define "legal" value, or "technical" value or
"legal eye" value? It is believed that the only way is to observe the
document being marked "accepted" by the buyer. "The defect ... is that it
contains no express consideration, nor are there any mutual promises from which
such consideration can be fairly inferred .... The only obligation assumed by
it was to pay nine cents a pound for such glue as it might order .... Unless
both parties to a contract are bound, so that either can sue the other for a breach,
neither is bound." We might differ with the court in its interpretation of the
buyer's words and arrive at a different result; but the court rested the decision
on lack of sufficient consideration and not on want of mutual agreement. See
also Wickham & B. Coal Co. v. Farmers Lumber Co. (1920) 189 Iowa 1183,
179 N. W. 417: "Appellant does not deny that a promise may be a con-
sideration for a promise. Its position is that this is so only of an enforceable
promise. That is the law."
'As, for example, in Keller v. Holderman (1863) 11 Mich. 248.
Of course, the question whether corisideration has some "value" is not iden-
tical with that of relative values. The law might require that extrinsic markets
shall show that a consideration has some value without requiring that they shall
show that the exchanged considerations have the same value.
Op. cit., footnote 5, p. 865.
'When in Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 2 Q. B. 851, Patteson, J., said that
consideration means something of some value in the eye of the law," he said
nothing further about "value in the eye of the law" as a test of sufficiency. His
main point was that it had to be something "moving from the plaintiff." This
point he proceeded to illustrate and apply. Even as to this, his statement is
not now prevailing law in the United States. Moreover, the "eye of the law"
is notoriously of impaired vision.
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working of the technical legal eye, to list the decisions and thus discover
.what considerations (some with economic value and some without)
have been held to be sufficient. Thus the cart is put before the horse;
and instead of "value" determining the decisions, the decisions de-
termine "value." This list of decisions must in any event be made;
by them we shall determine what considerations are sufficient, and also
(if the matter seems to be of any importance) what considerations
have "value in the eye of the law." If they show that non-binding
promises have been held to be insufficient consideration, they may also
be said to show that non-binding promises have no "legal value"; but
they cannot be said to show that they are insufficient consideration
because they have no "legal value".
In exactly the same way, "detriment" and "benefit" became in-
effective in determining the sufficiency of consideration. Since many
considerations that were not detrimental or beneficial in any economic
or factual sense were held to be sufficient, and others that were ad-
mittedly detrimental or beneficial were held to be not sufficient, it became
customary to say that the test of sufficiency was "legal detriment" or
detriment "in a technical sense" or detriment "in the eye of the law."
The very thing we wish to know was what considerations "the eye of
the law" looked upon as sufficient, and this can be determined only by
an inductive collection of decisions-the very collection necessary to
determine what considerations are "legal detriments" or detriments "in
a technical sense" or detriments "in the eye of the law.'
12
It appears, therefore, that if an "illusory" or other non-binding
promise is not a sufficient consideration, the rule is not reached by a
mere process" of deduction from a supposedly more general rule that
consideration must have "legal value" or be a "legal detriment." Such
a particular rule may be a correct one; but its correctness must be
shown by an inductive collection of decisions in point. If such deci-
-2 A similar error could be made in using the term "sufficient consideration."
If "consideration" is defined in a purely factual sense (as we define "value," or
"detriment" or "benefit"), to wit: "an act, forbearance, or promise requested
and given in exchange for a promise," it ceases to denote with exactness one or
more of those operative facts that make a contract. Some considerations
within the definition will not help to make a contract; and in many sorts of cases
an informal contract can be made without any consideration at all. We there-
fore add a qualifying adjective and say that the only kind of consideration that
will help to make a contract is a "sufficient" consideration. Observe, now, that
there is not the slightest possibility of determining the enforceability of a
promise by the use of this concept deductively. To say that a void promise
vill not make a return promise binding because the law requires a "sufficient"
consideration is a glaring example of begging the question. Its defects are no
different in kind, however, from those involved in saying that a void promise
is not a sufficient consideration because it has no "legal value" or "value in the
eye of the law." It is not the quality of "sufficiency" that causes a court to
hold a certain consideration to be "sufficient."
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sions exist, it is possible that they may be explained on tle ground that
the courts regard such a consideration as having too slight an economic
value; the general markets for such a commodity are too few and too
weak. They may perhaps be explained on the ground that the courts
thought the consideration too slight an economic detriment or benefit.
Or, they might be explained on some other ground of social policy.
It is conceivable that the sufficiency of consideration might be -deter-
mined by some particular standard of economic value or by some speci-
fied degree of factual detriment; but the writer believes that the de-
cisions do not justify the construction of a rule on any such basis.
The only possible generalization, the deductive use of which does
not involve a begging of the question, is one that is constructed out of
factual elements that in the past have induced courts to act or that
a lawgiver declares must induce courts to act. In a new case possess-
ing those factual elements the court's action may be predicted with a
moderate degree of confidence but not with certainty.
Professor Williston writes: "The test of 'value in the eye of the
law' remained and is in substance the same for both classes of cases-
a 'legal' detriment to the promisee or 'legal' benefit to the promisor-
something which changes the legal position that the party giving or re-
ceiving the consideration occupied prior to the bargain."1 3 This sen-
tence suggests a definition, not only of "legal value" and "legal detri-
ment," but also of "sufficient consideration." It is "something which
changes the legal position . .. " A definition so worded cannot be relied
on..
The consideration in a unilateral contract may be such as to op-
erate per se to change the "legal position" of the promisee. When
such is the case, this may be an added reason for holding the consid-
eration to be sufficient. Thus, if the promisee releases a mortgage he
extinguishes his property interest; if he surrenders or cancels a prom-
issory note, he extinguishes his right to payment; if he rejects an offer,
he destroys his power of acceptance; if he hands over a gold piece or
a book, he extinguishes his property interest in the chattel. All these
performances, changing legal position, are sufficient as a consideration.
A consideration may be sufficient, however, even though it changes
not a single legal relation of either the promisee or the promisor. A
change or forbearance to change one's physical position is quite suf-
ficient; so also, a forbearance to change one's legal position (for-
" Op. cit., footnote 5, p. 866. The present writer's objections to "legal
detriment" as a definitional term have been stated above. "Legal detriment" has
been defined as any act or forbearance not already required by existing legal
duty. This does not beg the question; but it does not accurately define "sufficient
consideration."
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bearance to iise a power) is just as sufficient as is a change therein.
If at request, a promisee (having made no promise, tacit or express)
plows a field or swims the Hudson or forbears to smoke for a year14 or
forbears to accept an offer that has been made him,15 he is not chang-
ing a single one of his legal relations; and yet all of these are sufficient
considerations. From beginning to end of these performances, after
the bargain is made and during its making, the performer and the prom-
isor had every right, power, privilege, and immunity that he had prior
thereto. If there are any other legal relations not included under. the
foregoing terms, they too are unchanged.
It has been urged by a few that the time has come to abandon the
requirement of a consideration; but the existing decisions show that
the courts would not now follow such a rule.' 6 It might be urged that
a promise should be made binding by any act, forbearance, or promise
bargained for in fact as the equivalent of a promise; again, existing
decisions do not permit of such a rule. It may be urged that a non-
binding promise is sufficient to make a return promise binding, even
though the second does not and cannot make the first binding. In de-
termining whether the courts will in fact follow this rule (whether it
is "the law"), we cannot rely upon any "deduction" from some more
general rule that a consideration is not sufficient unless it has value
(either factual or "legal"), or that a consideration is not sufficient un-
less it is a detriment (either factual or "legal") to the promisee or a
benefit (either factual or "legal") to the promisor. Even though these
concepts (especially factual "detriment" and "benefit") may have play-
'See Hamer v. Sidway (1891) 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256. If in this case
the nephew promised that he would forbear to smoke, and if under the law
this promise is binding, he changed his legal position, in that he extinguished
his privilege of smoking (undertook a duty to the uncle not to smoke). Even
in the case of such a bilateral contract the change in legal position is the result
of the contract; the contract is not the result of a change in legal position. But
even if the nephew made no promise at all, his actual forbearance as requested
would be sufficient consideration; and yet at every moment of such performance,
and afterwards too, he remained legally privileged to smoke.
See the excellent statements in Strong v. Sheffield, supra, footnote 6, and
Miles v. Alford Estate Co. (1886) L. R. 32 Ch. D. 266 (per Lord Bowen).
See White v. McMath (1913) 127 Tenn. 713, 156 S. W. 470. Likewise,
forbearance to make an offer is not prevented from being a sufficient considera-
tion because it does not change one's legal position. Hopkins v. Ensign (1890)
122 N. Y. 144, 25 N. E. 306.
'" It is true that in certain classes of cases the requirement has already long
been abandoned, if we accept as the definition of consideration one favored by
many writers: "an act, forbearance, or promise requested and given in return
for a promise." The many sufficient "past considerations" are by this definition,
as Sir William Anson truly says, no consideration at all; and the same is true
in those cases holding that subsequent action in reliance on a promise makes it
binding even though such action was "no more than a condition or a natural
consequence of the promise." Holmes, C. J., in Martin v. Meles (1901) 179
Mass. 114, 60 N. E. 397.
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ed a considerable part in the development of the law, they have not so
restrained its development that a consideration is not now sufficient un-
less the requirement indicated by these terms exists. This is shown by
modern decisions dispensing with such a requirement. We must start
anew, therefore, and construct inductively from the collected decisions
down to date a new definition of "consideration," a new definition of
"sufficient consideration," and a new rule determining the enforceability
of promises. Such a rule may be safe for a decade as a basis for the
decision of new cases that appear to fall within its terms. It is certain
that new notions will gradually make it more or less unsafe thereafter
and that new definitions and rules will be constructed by our successors.
An answer to the question under discussion-whether a promise
that itself remains not binding on its maker is generally (or at least in
some cases) not sufficient to make a return promise binding-is indi-.
cated by the following:" (1) The dictum that both parties to a bilat-
eral agreement must be bound or neither is bound is inveterate.1 s
(2) Many cases have held that a promise is made insufficient as a con-
sideration if the promisor reserves an "option to cancel."' 19 (3) There
are decisions holding that an "illusory promise" is not sufficient con-
sideration for the reason that it is not binding (and not for the reason
that it was not the requested equivalent or that no equivalent was, in
fact, requested) .20 (4) If two promises, one of which is void for il-
legality, are made by A in exchange for one lawful promise by B, it
has been said that B's promise is void and not sufficient consideration
for the one lawful promise made by A. 21 An exhaustive study of the
cases in these fields, along with those in which void and voidable prom-
ises are held to be sufficient consideration, is necessary in order to deter-
17 The list here made is merely suggestive, not exhaustive.
The writer is quite willing to abandon such a dictum if actual decisions
have undermined it, whether intentionally or unintentionally, through ignorance,
forgetfulness, or fiction. Many another equally glittering phrase and doctrine
has been shown to be a "wind ball that has gone bouncing down the ages."
Phelps, Falstaff and Equity (1901) 45, 46. Professor Williston appears to be
right, however, when he indicates that there is no obvious social demand for
the abolition of the rule..
"1 Williston, Contracts (1920) § 105; Page, Contracts (2d ed. 1922) § 572.
The present writer believes that the rule has been applied in cases where it
should not have been. "See The Effect of Options on Consideration (1925) 34
Yale Law Journ. 471, passim. The cases show none the less the attitude of the
courts on the problem involved in this article.
'See supra, footnote 8.
"13 Willistbn, op. cit., footnote 19, §§ 1780, 1782; Page, op. cit., footnote 19,§ 1031. The cases cited as authority for this appear to be doubtful and confused.
They involve the distinction between the terms "void" and "illegal" and are
much concerned with questions of divisibility. The law appears to be stated
contra in 13 Corp. jur. 512, citing many cases unconfirmed by the present writer.
See also Erie Ry. v. Union Loco. & Ex. Co. (1871) 35 N. J. L. 240, and Sarco
Co. v. Gulliver (N. J. Eq. 1925) 129 Atl. 399, apparently contra.
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mine the extent to which the rule requiring mutuality of obligation still
prevails. A statement of where the rule ends and the exceptions begin
is not a simple matter.
AhiTHUR L. COR13IN
YALE LAW SCHOOL
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